We study the cyclical implications of credit market imperfections in a dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model wherein …rms face persistent shocks to both aggregate and individual productivity. In our model economy, optimal capital reallocation is distorted by two frictions. First, collateralized borrowing constraints limit the investment undertaken by small …rms with relatively high productivities. Second, speci…city in …rm-level capital implies partial investment irreversibilities that lead …rms to pursue generalized (S,s) investment rules. This second friction compounds the …rst in implying that large and relatively unproductive …rms carry a disproportionate share of the aggregate capital stock, thereby reducing endogenous aggregate total factor productivity. Moreover, because irreversibilities induce both downward and upward inertia in …rm-level capital adjustment, they ensure that the negative consequences of a temporary tightening in …nancial markets are not quickly repaired. In the presence of persistent heterogeneity in both capital and total factor productivity, the e¤ects of a …nancial shock can be ampli…ed and propagated through large and long-lived disruptions to the distribution of capital that, in turn, imply large and persistent reductions in aggregate total factor productivity. Similarly, the consequences of a negative real shock can be exacerbated and prolonged in the presence of real and …nancial frictions. This paper seeks to measure the strength of these e¤ects in a calibrated DSGE setting. We …nd that an unanticipated tightening in borrowing conditions can, on its own, generate a large recession that is far more persistent than the …nancial shock itself, and the recovery that follows is led by rises in business …xed investment, rather than in household consumption spending.
Introduction
Can a large shock to an economy's …nancial sector produce a large and lasting recession?
Can it amplify and propagate the e¤ects of a real shock su¢ ciently to transform recession into depression? Over the past two years, negative events in the real and …nancial sectors of the U.S.
and other large, developed economies have become increasingly di¢ cult to disentangle. If the current conditions have reawakened interest in business cycle research, they have also made clear how limited are our existing macroeconomic models in their ability to address such topics.
In this paper, we develop a quantitative, dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model that may better inform current and future discussions regarding the interactions of real and …nan-cial shocks in determining the size and frequency of aggregate ‡uctuations. In our model, …rms experience persistent shocks to both aggregate and individual productivity, while credit market frictions interact with real frictions to yield persistent disruptions to the e¢ cient allocation of capital across them, and thus persistent reductions in endogenous aggregate productivity. Calibrating our model to aggregate and …rm-level data, we use it as a laboratory in which to obtain quantitatively disciplined answers to the questions raised above.
Capital reallocation is distorted by two frictions in our model, one …nancial and one real. First, collateralized borrowing constraints limit the investment undertaken by small …rms with relatively high productivities. Second, speci…city in capital implies partial investment irreversibilities that lead …rms to pursue generalized (S,s) rules with respect to their capital adjustments. The second friction compounds the …rst, further tilting the distribution of production towards larger, less productive …rms, and thus reducing endogenous aggregate total factor productivity, and it also exacerbates the direct e¤ects of collateral constraints by reducing the collateral value ascribed to each unit of installed capital. This added element of realism in our setting relative to existing DSGE …nancial frictions models may be quite important to the transmission and propagation of a …nancial shock, as we discuss below.
Because speci…city in capital induces both downward and upward inertia in …rm-level investment activities, and because it tightens the borrowing limits implied by collateralized lending, it ensures that the negative consequences of a temporary tightening in …nancial markets cannot be quickly reversed. In the presence of persistent heterogeneity in both capital and total factor productivity, the e¤ects of …nancial frictions are ampli…ed and propagated through large and longlived disruptions to the distribution of capital that, in turn, imply large and persistent reductions in aggregate productivity. For example, in the presence of only a 5 percent capital irreversibility, we …nd that steady state output falls by 9 percent when collateralized borrowing limits are introduced. This suggests the potential for large output losses in our model economy following a …nancial shock, or following a real shock accompanied by a …nancial one, since the long-run GDP reduction in response to a change in borrowing constraints fails to capture the sharp transitional reductions associated with reallocation following the shock.
As indicated above, we use our model to measure the extent to which a …nancial shock can spill into the real side of a calibrated economy to produce large and persistent reductions in aggregate employment and GDP on its own, as well as the extent to which it can amplify and prolong the e¤ects of a modest-sized real shock. From the outset, understanding that investment is a small fraction of GDP, it is clear that the reductions in aggregate capital implied by a temporary reduction in available credit are unlikely to deliver sizeable or long-lived aggregate real e¤ects.
However, we also know from disaggregated data that there is substantial heterogeneity among …rms in their individual productivity levels, and there are real frictions limiting the reallocation of capital across them. 1 As such, the mechanism we explore here focuses on the economy's e¤ ective capital stock and endogenous total factor productivity.
Our primary question in this study is whether a temporary crisis in …nancial markets can generate a large and persistent drop in aggregate productivity by disrupting the distribution of capital away from that implied by …rms'relative productivities, and thereby distorting the distribution of production. Of course, we are not the …rst to emphasize reductions in measured TFP arising from a misallocation of resources across …rms. Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) show that this channel can be important in explaining cross-country per-capita GDP di¤erences. However, we are to our knowledge the …rst to explore this channel in a quantitative DSGE setting where real frictions slow the reallocation of capital across …rms, and where that reallocation is essential in determining the marginal product of the aggregate stock. We …nd that changes in the distribution of capital can have large and long-lived e¤ects in our model economy, which come primarily through their implications for aggregate productivity. Most notably, an unanticipated …nancial shock lasting only a few periods can deliver large and persistent declines in output and 1 For direct evidence of large and increasing heterogeneity in …rm-level productivity, see Comin and Philippon (2005) and the empirical studies cited therein. Elsewhere, Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) …nd it is impossible to reproduce microeconomic investment patterns without both large idiosyncratic shocks and adjustment costs limiting capital reallocation.
other aggregate quantities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie ‡y summarizes the literature most closely related to our work. Next, in section 3, we present our model economy. Section 4 provides some analysis useful in developing a numerical algorithm capable of its solution. In section 5, we describe our calibration to moments drawn from postwar U.S. aggregate and …rm-level data. Section 6 explores the mechanics of our model in its deterministic steady state and draws some comparisons to the mechanics in a reference model with capital speci…city but no …nancial frictions. Section 7 presents dynamic results. There, we compare our economy's business cycle moments to those in two reference models lacking …nancial frictions, verifying that our model generates plausible business cycles when it is driven by exogenous shocks to aggregate productivity alone and isolating the consequences of the real and …nancial friction in these ‡uctuations. Next, we examine the economy's response to an unanticipated reduction in the availability of credit, considering this …nancial shock both in isolation and alongside a negative technology shock, and then we examine the recovery path once credit conditions have returned to normal.
Related literature
To be clear, there is a vast existing literature considering the implications of …nancial market imperfections. For example, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) study a model of credit cycles and show that collateral constraints can have a role in amplifying and propagating shocks to the value of collateral. 2 More recent studies challenge the …nding, however, as one arising from an overly stylized environment. Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) argue that the e¤ects are actually quite small in a more plausibly calibrated model. The explanation for this may be best articulated in a short article by Kocherlakota (2000) . However, a common, and likely critical, element across these papers is the abstraction from any additional source of heterogeneity across …rms. One notable exception is the recent paper by Buera and Shin (2007) . While Buera and Shin emphasize development concerns, their primary …nding that …nancial frictions can have a large and persistent impact on the aggregate transition to a steady state, particularly when capital is initially misallocated, is certainly an informative one for our study. It suggests that our allowance for real capital frictions alongside the …nancial friction they consider may be important in magnifying and propagating business cycle ‡uctuations.
Elsewhere in the investment literature, various empirical and theoretical studies have together mounted a strong case that real frictions limiting the reallocation of capital are essential in explaining microeconomic investment data. (See, for instance, Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) or Caballero and Engel (1999) .) Moreover, these frictions have been shown to add persistence to an economy's aggregate response to shocks (Bertola and Caballero (1994) ). Thus, the fact that the …nancial frictions literature has largely ignored real frictions may be costly along both empirical and theoretical margins. Of course, the same could be said of the investment literature's abstraction from …nancial frictions, as this abstraction may be critical in the repeated …nding that nonconvex capital adjustment costs, as well as investment irreversibilities, have essentially no importance for the aggregate business cycle of a DSGE model economy (e.g., Thomas (2003) and Veracierto (2002) ).
There is one existing study that does simultaneously consider real and …nancial frictions in a dynamic, stochastic setting. Caggese (2007) provides a careful exploration of precisely how collateralized borrowing constraints can interact with investment irreversibility to exacerbate aggregate ‡uctuations. There are two critical di¤erences in our analysis. The …rst is our assumption that capital investments are only partly irreversible. The second is general equilibrium.
Model
In our model economy, …rms face both partial capital …xity and collateralized borrowing limits, which together compound the e¤ects of persistent di¤erences in their total factor productivities to yield substantial heterogeneity in production. We begin our description of the economy with an initial look at the optimization problem facing each …rm, then follow with a brief discussion of households and equilibrium. Next, using a simple implication of equilibrium alongside some immediate observations about …rms' optimal allocation of pro…ts across dividends and retained earnings, we characterize the capital adjustment decisions of our …rms. This analysis will show how it is possible for us to derive a convenient, computationally tractable algorithm to solve for equilibrium allocations in our model, despite its three-dimensional heterogeneity in production.
Production, credit and capital adjustment
We assume a large number of …rms, each producing a homogenous output using predetermined capital stock k and labor n, via an increasing and concave production function, y = z"F (k; n).
Here, z represents exogenous stochastic total factor productivity common across …rms, while " is a …rm-speci…c counterpart. For convenience, we assume that " is a Markov chain, " 2 E f" 1 ; : : : ; " N" g, where Pr (" 0 = " j j " = " i ) ij 0, and P N" j=1 ij = 1 for each i = 1; : : : ; N " . Similarly, z 2 fz 1 ; : : : ; z Nz g, where Pr (z 0 = z m j z = z l ) z lm 0, and P N" m=1 z lm = 1 for each l = 1; : : : ; N z .
Because our interest is in understanding how …nancial constraints interact with the speci…city of capital in shaping the investment decisions taken by …rms in our economy, we must prevent …rms growing so large that none will never again experience a binding borrowing limit. To ensure this does not occur, we impose exit and entry in the model. In particular, we assume that each …rm faces a …xed probability, d 2 (0; 1), that it will be forced to exit the economy following production in any given period. Within a period, prior to investment, …rms learn whether they will survive to produce in the next period. Exiting …rms are replaced by an equal number of new …rms whose initial state will be described below.
At the beginning of each period, a …rm is de…ned by its predetermined stock of capital, k 2 K R + , by the level of one-period debt it incurred in the previous period, b 2 B R, and by its current idiosyncratic productivity level, " 2 f" 1 ; : : : ; " Ne g. Immediately thereafter, the …rm learns whether it will survive to produce in the next period. Given this individual state, and having observed the current aggregate state, the …rm then takes a series of actions to maximize the expected discounted value of the current and future dividends returned to its shareholders, the households in our economy. First, it chooses its current level of employment, undertakes production, and pays its wage bill. Thereafter, it repays its existing debt and, conditional on survival, it chooses its investment, i, current dividends, and the level of debt with which it will enter into the next period, b 0 . For each unit of debt it incurs for the next period, a …rm receives q units of output that it can use toward paying current dividends or investing in its future capital.
The relative price q 1 re ‡ecting the interest rate at which …rms can borrow and lend is, of course, a function of the economy's aggregate state, as is the wage rate ! paid to workers. For expositional convenience, we suppress the arguments of these equilibrium price functions until we have described the model further.
In contrast to the typical setting with …rm-level capital adjustment frictions, and unlike a typical environment with …nancial frictions, real and …nancial frictions are allowed to interact in our model economy. 
where 2 (0; 1) is the rate of capital depreciation, and primes indicate one-period-ahead values.
Because there is some degree of speci…city in capital, the same equation does not apply when the …rm undertakes negative investment. In this case, the e¤ective relative price of investment is k rather than 1, so the accumulation equation is instead:
In the analysis section to follow, we will show how the asymmetry that …rms face in the cost of capital adjustment naturally gives rise to two-sided (S; s) investment decision rules. For the moment, we simply point out that, in contrast to a nonconvexity in the capital adjustment technology, this type of adjustment friction implies not only investment inaction among …rms within their (S; s) adjustment bands, but also some inertia among …rms outside of their (S; s)
bands. Because there are no increasing returns in the adjustment technology, but instead a linear penalty for negative adjustments, a …rm …nding itself with an intolerably high capital stock (given its current productivity), will reduce its stock only to the upper bound of its (S; s) inactivity range.
Similarly, a …rm with too little capital recognizes that it will incur a linear penalty should it later need to shed capital, so it invests only to the lower bound of its inactivity range.
It should be clear from the discussion above that, alongside its current productivity draw, a …rm's capital adjustment may also be in ‡uenced by its ability to borrow (now and in the future), which is in turn a¤ected by the capital (collateral) it currently holds. Note also that the …rm's current investment decision may in ‡uence the level of debt it carries into the next period. These observations imply that we must keep track of the distinguishing features of …rms along three dimensions: their capital, k, their debt, b, and their idiosyncratic productivity, ".
We summarize the distribution of …rms over (k; b; ") using the probability measure de…ned on the Borel algebra, S, for the product space S = K B E. The aggregate state of the economy is then described by (z; ), and the distribution of …rms evolves over time according to a mapping, , from the current aggregate state; 0 = (z; ). The evolution of the …rm distribution is determined in part by the actions of continuing …rms and in part by entry and exit. Following production in each period, fraction d of existing …rms exit the economy. These …rms invest negatively to shed their remaining capital, returning the proceeds to households, and are replaced by the same number of new …rms. Each new …rm has zero debt and productivity " 0 2 E drawn from an initial distribution H(" 0 ), and each enters with an initial capital stock k 0 2 K. 4 We are now in a position to set out the optimization problem solved by each …rm in our economy. Let v 0 (k; b; " i ; z l ; ) represent the expected discounted value of a …rm that enters the period with (k; b) and …rm-speci…c productivity " i , when the aggregate state of the economy is (z l ; ), just before it learns whether it will survive into the next period. We state the …rm's dynamic optimization problem using a functional equation de…ned by (1) -(4) below.
After the start of the period, the …rm knows which line of (1) will prevail. If it is not continuing beyond the period, the …rm simply chooses labor to maximize its current dividend payment to shareholders. Because it will carry no capital or debt into the future, an exiting …rm's dividends are its output, less wage payments and debt repayment, together with the remaining capital it can successfully uninstall at the end of the period. The problem conditional on continuation is more involved, because a continuing …rm must choose its current labor and dividends alongside its future capital and debt. For expositional convenience, given the partial irreversibility in investment, we begin to describe this problem by de…ning the …rm's value as the result of a binary choice between upward versus downward capital adjustment in (2), then proceed to identify the value associated 4 We select k0 below so that each entrant's capital is fraction of the typical stock held across all …rms in the long-run of our economy; that is, k0
, where e represents the steady-state distribution.
with each option in (3) and (4). 5
Assume that d m (z l ; ) is the discount factor applied by …rms to their next-period expected value if aggregate productivity at that time is z m and the current aggregate state is (z l ; ). Taking as given the evolution of " and z according to the transition probabilities speci…ed above, and taking as given the the evolution of the …rm distribution, 0 = (z; ), the …rm solves the following two optimization problems to determine its values conditional on (weakly) positive and negative capital adjustment. (Here forward, except where necessary for clarity, we suppress the indices for current aggregate and …rm productivity.) In each case, the …rm selects its current employment and production, alongside the debt and capital with which it will enter into next period and its current dividends, D, to maximize its expected discounted dividends. As above, dividends are determined by the …rm's budget constraint as the residual of its current production and borrowing after its wage bill and debt repayment have been covered, net of its investment expenditures.
Conditional on an upward capital adjustment, the …rm solves the following problem constrained, respectively, by (i) the fact that investment must be non-negative, (ii)-(iii) the requirements that dividends be non-negative and satisfy the …rm's budget constraint and (iv) a borrowing limit determined by its collateral.
The downward adjustment problem di¤ers from that above only in that investment must be 5 We could instead describe the …rm's problem without the binary max operator by adopting an indicator function determining the relative price of capital as 1 in the event of k 0 (1 )k and k otherwise. Here, for sake of clarity, we opt for the less concise representation, though we will abandon it at some points below.
non-positive and, thus, its relative price is k .
We will simplify the …rm's problem to isolate its decision rules in section 4 below. For now, notice that there is no friction associated with the …rm's employment choice, since the …rm pays its current wage bill after production takes place, and its capital choice for next period also has no implications for current production. Thus, irrespective of their current debt or their continuation into the next period, all …rms sharing in common the same (k; ") combination select the same employment, which we will denote by N (k; "; z; ), and hence common production, y(k; "; z; ).
The same cannot be said for the intertemporal decisions of continuing …rms, given the presence of both borrowing limits and irreversibilities. Thus, K (k; b; "; z; ) and B (k; b; "; z; ) represent the choices of next-period capital and debt, respectively, made by …rms sharing in common a complete individual type (k; b; ").
Households
The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical households. Household wealth is held as one-period shares in …rms, which we denote using the measure . 6 Given the prices they receive for their current shares, 0 (k; b; "; z; ), and the real wage they receive for their labor e¤ort, ! (z; ), households determine their current consumption, c, hours worked, n h , as well as the numbers of new shares, 0 (k 0 ; b 0 ; " 0 ), to purchase at prices 1 (k 0 ; b 0 ; " 0 ; z; ). The lifetime expected utility maximization problem of the representative household is listed below.
Let C h ( ; z; ) describe the household choice of current consumption, and let N h ( ; z; ) be the allocation of current available time to working. Finally, let h (k 0 ; b 0 ; " 0 ; ; z; ) be the quantity of shares purchased in …rms that will begin the next period with k 0 units of capital, b 0 units of debt, and idiosyncratic productivity " 0 .
Recursive equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of functions,
that solve …rm and household problems and clear the markets for assets, labor and output, as described by the following conditions.
(i) v 0 solves (1) - (4) , N is the associated policy function for exiting …rms, and (N; K; B) are the associated policy functions for continuing …rms
(ii) V h solves (5), and C h ; N h ; h are the associated policy functions for households
for all (D; " j ) 2 S, de…nes , where
Using C and N to describe the market-clearing values of household consumption and hours worked satisfying conditions (iv) and (v) above, it is straightforward to show that market-clearing requires that (a) the real wage equal the household marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, ! (z; ) = D 2 U (C; 1 N ) =D 1 U (C; 1 N ), that (b) the bond price, q 1 , equal the expected gross real interest rate, q (z; ) =
, and that (c) …rms' state-contingent discount factors agree with the household discounted marginal utility of consumption across states
Given these results, we may compute equilibrium by solving a single Bellman equation that combines the …rm-level pro…t maximization problem with these equilibrium implications of household utility maximization, e¤ectively subsuming the implications of households'decisions into the problems faced by …rms.
Without loss of generality, we assign p(z; ) as an output price at which …rms value current dividends and payments and correspondingly assume that …rms discount their future values by the household subjective discount factor. Given this alternative means of expressing …rms' discounting, the following three conditions ensure all markets clear in our economy.
A reformulation of (1) - (4) then yields an equivalent description of a …rm's dynamic problem where each …rm's value is measured in units of marginal utility, rather than output, with no change in the resulting decision rules. Suppressing the arguments of the price functions, exploiting the fact that the choice of n is independent of the k 0 and b 0 choices, and using the indicator function
to distinguish the relative price of nonnegative versus negative investment, we have:
where V (k; b; " i ; z l ; ) = max
and subject to b
Analysis
The problem listed in equations (9) - (12) forms the basis for solving equilibrium allocations in our economy, so long as the prices p; ! and q taken as given by our …rms satisfy the restrictions in (6) - (8) above. 7 From here, we begin to characterize the decision rules arising from this problem. Each …rm chooses its labor n = N (k; "; z; ) to solve z"D 2 F (k; n; z; ) = !(z; ), which immediately returns its current production, y (k; ") = z"F (k; N (k; "; z; )), so that any …rm of type (k; b; ") will achieve current pro…t ‡ows (k; b; ") de…ned below irrespective of its capital adjustment or borrowing decision.
The challenging objects to determine are D; k 0 and b 0 for continuing …rms. Turning to these, we will use a simple observation about the implications of borrowing constraints for the value a …rm places on retained earnings versus dividends. As long as the …rm places non-zero probability weight on encountering a future state in which its borrowing constraint will bind, the shadow value of retained earnings (which includes the discounted sequence of multipliers on future borrowing constraints) will necessarily exceed the shadow value of current dividends, p. 8 This means that, as long as the …rm may face a binding borrowing limit in the future, it will set D = 0. In this case, equation 11 establishes that the …rm's choice of k 0 directly implies the level of debt with which it will enter into the next period. We refer to any such …rm as a constrained …rm, and list the resulting univariate problem it solves after deciding it will pay no dividends in the current period.
We can make a related observation about the value a …rm places on retained earnings versus dividends if it has accumulated su¢ cient wealth (via k > 0 or b < 0) such that collateral constraints will never again a¤ect its investment activities. In this case, the sequence of multipliers 7 Here, and in many instances below, we suppress the z; arguments of price functions, decision rules and …rm-level state vectors to reduce notation. 8 This is easily proved using a sequence approach with explicit multipliers on each constraint; see Caggese (2007) .
on all possible future borrowing constraints are zero and, at the margin, the …rm is indi¤erent between allocating pro…ts to savings versus paying dividends. We refer to any such …rm as an unconstrained.
In order to insure that an unconstrained …rm will not experience a binding borrowing constraint (in any conceivable future state), it must follow a savings policy such that no history of z and " leads to a level of debt exceeding k. Given this policy, the …rm's savings or debt will not a¤ect its investment. It follows that, for an unconstrained …rm, we do not need to know b 0 to derive k 0 . We exploit this property and describe unconstrained …rms'investment. In doing so, we assume, without loss of generality, that b 0 = 0.
The …rm chooses k 0 to solve,
, where
Referring back to equation 13, note that a …rm that has just become unconstrained, having entered into the period with some nonzero debt (savings) b 6 = 0, sees its value linearly reduced (raised) by the associated reduction (rise) in current dividends, which are valued by p. Thus, we can alternatively express the value of any unconstrained …rm of type (k; b; ") as w (k; ") pb, where w (k; ") W (k; 0; "). The …rm's beginning-of-period expected value inherits the same property;
W 0 (k; b; " i ; z l ; ) = w 0 (k; ") pb, where w 0 (k; ") W 0 (k; 0; ").
In the next section, we will de…ne the minimum savings policy that must be followed by any unconstrained …rm. This policy will de…ne a threshold level of b, as a function of (k; " i ; z l ; ), such that …rms that hold actual debt less than this threshold will be indi¤erent between paying dividends and retaining earnings.
Decisions among unconstrained …rms
In this section we …rst characterize the investment policy of an unconstrained …rm, then its resultant minimum savings policy. Starting with investment, it is expositionally useful to adopt the following less concise means of representing the problem in (15) .
+ max
In the above, W u and W d are both strictly increasing in k. This in turn implies that W and W 0 are strictly increasing functions of the unconstrained …rm's capital, as are the w and w 0 functions de…ned above.
We may characterize the capital decision rule for an unconstrained …rm by reference to two target capital stocks, the upward and downward adjustment targets that would solve the problems in (16) and (17), respectively, were there no sign restrictions on investment. De…ne the upward target, k u , as the capital a …rm would choose given a unit relative price of investment, and de…ne the downward target, k d , as the capital a …rm would choose given a relative price at k .
Notice that each target is independent of current capital and depends only on the aggregate state and the …rm's current ". As such, all unconstrained …rms that share in common the same current productivity " have the same upward and downward target capitals. Note also that, because k < 1 (and because the value function w 0 is strictly increasing in k), the upward adjustment target necessarily lies below the downward target:
We are now in a convenient position to retrieve the unconstrained …rm's capital decision rule.
Given a constant price associated with raising (lowering) its capital stock, and because w 0 is increasing in k, the …rm selects a future capital as close to the upward (downward) target as its constraint set allows. Thus, the …rm's decision rules conditional on upward adjustment and downward adjustment are as follow.
Given these conditional adjustment rules, we know that an unconstrained …rm of type (k; b; ") selects one of three future capital levels, k 0 2 fk u (") ; k d (") ; (1 ) kg. Which one it selects depends only on where its current capital lies in relation to its two targets.
, so the …rm makes no adjustment to its capital. If, instead, the …rm's capital is su¢ ciently low that its implied stock for next period under no adjustment lies below the upward target, k <
, then
In this case, the …rm selects k u ("), since (1 ) k is in the constraint set for upward capital adjustment. Finally, if the …rm's implied capital for next period under no adjustment lies above the downward target, k >
In this case, the …rm selects k d ("), since (1 ) k is in the constraint set for a downward adjustment. Collecting these observations, we have the following (S; s) capital decision rule for an unconstrained …rm.
Given the decision rule for capital, we now describe a minimum level of savings that ensures that an unconstrained …rm of type ("; k) will never be a¤ected by borrowing constraints across all possible future (" 0 ; S 0 ). Any …rm that maintains a level of savings at least equal to the threshold de…ned by the minimum savings policy will be indi¤erent to paying additional revenues in the form of dividends, or accumulating further savings. This, in turn, implies that the …rm is willing to follow the minimum savings policy.
For an unconstrained …rm with a beginning of period level of debt, b, de…ne pro…ts after debt repayment and investment expenditures as
Next, let e B K W (k; " i ; S) ; " j ; z m ; 0 (S) de…ne the maximum debt level at which a …rm entering next period with capital K W and (" j ; z m ) may remain unconstrained. Given e B, the following pair of equations recursively de…ne the minimum savings policy, B W K W (k; "; S) ; "; S .
In equation 22, B W K W (k; "; S) ; "; S is derived as the maximum level of debt with which the …rm can exit this period and remain unconstrained next period. Next, (23) de…nes the beginning of period maximum debt level using the minimum savings policy function. Notice that e B is increasing in the …rm's current pro…ts as these may be used to cover outstanding debt. The minimum operator imposes the borrowing constraint; if the …rm doesn't have su¢ cient collateral to borrow B W , then it can only be unconstrained this period if it has entered with su¢ cient savings to …nance investment.
Given the capital rule and the necessary savings policy, we can directly retrieve the …rm's dividends, and thus its value.
where
Decisions among constrained …rms
We now consider the decisions made by a …rm that has not previously attained su¢ cient wealth to become unconstrained. The …rst essential step is to establish whether or not the …rm has crossed the relevant wealth threshold to become unconstrained. If it has, the decision rules isolated above apply. If it has not, the collateralized borrowing constraint will continue to in ‡uence its investment decisions, so that the capital and debt decisions remain intertwined.
To ascertain whether a …rm of type (k; b; ") has become unconstrained, we need only consider whether it is feasible for the …rm to adopt the capital rule K W (k; ") and the savings rule B W K W (k; " i ; S) ; " i ; S while paying no dividends in the current period. If a previously constrained …rm of type (k; b; ") is able to adopt the decision rules in (20) and (22) without violating the non-negativity of dividends, then it achieves the value W (k; b; "; z; ) from (24) , and exits the period indistinguishable from any other unconstrained …rm that entered it with (k; ").
Any constrained …rm that is able to adopt the decision rules of an unconstrained …rm will always choose to do so as V W . However, when the inequality above cannot be satis…ed, the …rm remains constrained; for any such …rm surviving beyond the current period, V (k; b; " i ; z l ; ) = V C (k; b; " i ; z l ; ). To isolate the decisions made by a continuing constrained …rm facing the problem in (14), we again …nd it useful to adopt a less concise representation and again suppress notation for the aggregate state where convenient.
We approach the constrained …rm's problem as follows. First, given its (k; "), we isolate a cuto¤ debt level under which (26) is a feasible option. The lowest choice of k 0 permitted by the non-negativity constraint on investment is (1 ) k. If this choice is not a¤ordable given the …rm's borrowing constraint, it cannot undertake even a trivial upward capital adjustment. Recalling the de…nition of (k; b; "), this is the case if
Thus, among any group of …rms sharing a common (k; "), only those with debt not exceeding b T (k; ") can consider an upward adjustment, where the threshold debt level is: To solve the problems (26) -(27), we identify the maximum capitals permitted by the borrowing constraint under upward versus downward capital adjustment, and then impose the relevant sign restrictions on investment to arrive at the constraint sets associated with each option.
Substituting in the debt implied by each capital choice and making use of our …ndings above, we may express the constrained …rm's value as follows.
and where:
Denoting the capitals that solve the conditional adjustment problems above by b k u (k; b; " i ; )
and b k d (k; b; " i ; ), and recalling that D C (k; b; " i ; ) = 0, we obtain the following decision rules for capital and debt.
The numerical algorithm we use to solve our model is an extension of that described in Thomas (2003, 2008 ) using the analysis above. More speci…cally, our solution involves repeated application of the contraction mapping implied by (28) to solve the constrained …rm value function V C , given the price functions p (z; ), !(z; ) and q(z; ) and the laws of motion implied by (z; ) ; ( ij ) and ( z lm ). In each instance, the starting point is solving (24) to isolate the unconstrained …rm value function W , which serves as an input for V C .
In the sections to follow, we will consider how the mechanics of our (full) model with real and …nancial frictions compare to those in two relevant reference models -one where there are no borrowing limits ( b ! 1) and one where there are neither …nancial nor real frictions ( b ! 1, k = 1). These two reference models will help us to isolate how much the interaction between credit constraints and micro-level capital rigidities in ‡uences our economy's aggregate dynamics.
Aside from the values of b and k , all three models share a common parameter set that is selected in our full model to best match moments drawn from postwar U.S. aggregate and …rm-level data.
To be clear, we do not re-calibrate the reference models; thus, the average capital/output ratio, hours worked, and other important aspects of these economies are allowed to vary as each friction is eliminated.
Functional forms
Across our model economies, we assume that the representative household's period utility is the result of indivisible labor (Rogerson (1988) ): u(c; L) = log c + 'L. The …rm-level production function is Cobb-Douglas: z"F (k; n) = z"k n . The initial capital stock of each entering …rm is a …xed fraction of the typical stock held across all …rms in the long-run of our full economy;
, where e represents the steady-state distribution therein.
In specifying our exogenous stochastic process for aggregate productivity, we begin by assuming a continuous shock following a mean zero AR (1) , and we discretize the resulting productivity process using a grid with 3 shock realizations (N z = 3) to obtain (z l ) and ( z lm ). We determine the …rm-speci…c productivity shocks (" i ) and the Markov Chain governing their evolution ( ij ) similarly by discretizing a log-normal process, log " 0 = " log " + 0 using 9 values (N " = 9).
Aggregate targets
We set the length of a period to correspond to one year, and we determine the values of , , , , ' and b using moments from the aggregate data as follows. First, we set the household discount factor, , to imply an average real interest rate of 4 percent, consistent with recent …ndings by Gomme, Ravikumar and Rupert (2008) . Next, the production parameter is set to yield an average labor share of income at 0:60 (Cooley and Prescott (1995) ). The depreciation rate, , is taken to imply an average investment-to-capital ratio of roughly 0:069, which corresponds to the average value for the private capital stock between 1954 and 2002 in the U.S. Fixed Asset Tables, controlling for growth. Given this value, we determine capital's share, , so that our model matches the average private capital-to-output ratio over the same period, at 2:3, and we set the parameter governing the preference for leisure, ', to imply an average of one-third of available time is spent in market work. Finally, we select the parameter governing the extent of …nancial frictions in our model, b , to imply an average debt-to-capital ratio matching that of nonfarm non…nancial businesses over 1952-05 in the Flow of Funds, 0:366.
Firm-level targets
The parameters we determine using moments drawn from …rm-level data are the exit rate, d , the fraction of the steady-state aggregate capital stock held by each entering …rm, , the extent of reversibilty in capital, k , and the persistence and variability of the …rm-speci…c productivity shocks, " and . We set the exit rate at 0:10, so that 10 percent of …rms enter and exit the economy each year. Next, we set = 0:10 so that entering …rms are, on average, one-tenth the size of the typical …rm in our economy (Davis and Haltiwanger (1992)). Thus, in undertaking this part of our calibration, we must select an appropriate model-generated sample for comparability with their sample. This we do by simulating a large number of …rms for 25 years, retaining only those …rms that survive throughout, and then restricting the dates over 9 While not a target in the calibration, our model also closely matches a fourth moment drawn from the Cooper and Haltiwanger study, the fraction of establishment-year observations wherein a positive investment spike (i=k > 0:20) occurs: 0:186.
which investment rates are measured to eliminate life-cycle e¤ects.
Resulting parameters
The table below lists the parameter set obtained from our calibration. Note that these parameters imply minimal real frictions in our model economy, with only a 5 percent loss incurred in uninstalling capital, and considerable …nancial frictions, with …rms able to take on debt only up to 54 percent of the value of their capital. Also note that …rm-level shocks are far more volatile and less persistent than aggregate ones. Given these aspects of the calibration, our model gives rise to a stationary distribution of …rms over (k; b; ") wherein roughly 60 percent of …rms are constrained (using the de…nition from section 4 above).
Steady state
We begin by considering the implications of borrowing limits and irreversibilities for the typical decisions made in our economy. Figure 1 overviews the stationary distribution of …rms in the baseline case of our full model, presenting three slices of the full distribution. In the top panel, we see the distribution of …rms over capital and debt levels at the lowest …rm-level productivity, while the middle and bottom present the counterparts at the median and highest levels of productivity.
Note that each panel of Figure 1 appears to have two essentially disjoint distributions. The …rst, where most …rms are identi…ed by negative levels of debt, and capital is on average higher, corresponds to older, wealthier …rms that are unconstrained. Elsewhere, the 10 percent of …rms newly entering the economy each period are scattered across each " level according to the ergodic productivity distribution. These …rms enter with zero debt and very low initial capital (roughly 0:13), and are found in a large (k; b) spike in each panel.
After its …rst date in production, each new …rm begins to take on debt in e¤ort to build up its capital. In the absence of the collateralized borrowing limits, young …rms would immediately take on a large, temporary debt that would allow them to jump to the capital stock selected by unconstrained …rms with the same current productivity level. Here, however, …rms with little collateral have a relatively limited ability to borrow, so their upward capital adjustments are gradualized, and we see ripples of these entering …rms slowly moving into higher ranges of k and b. Over time, those …rms that survive long enough eventually reach a level of capital such that, having accumulated su¢ cient collateral, their investment decisions are no longer a¤ected by borrowing limits. As this occurs, the …rm in question leaves the constrained group, moving to the unconstrained distribution. As would be expected, the mean capital among unconstrained …rms rises with …rm-level productivity. The same is true for constrained …rms, though this is somewhat harder to see given the perspective of the …gure. Figure 2 is the no-…nancial frictions counterpart to Figure 1 . It shows the stationary distribution of …rms at the same three productivity slices in an otherwise identical economy where no …rm is ever constrained (with …rms able to borrow many times over the collateral value of their capital). As in the previous …gure, new …rms enter the economy with low initial capital. Here, however, these young …rms can immediately borrow all they require to reach their unconstrained capital targets for the start of the next period and join the mass of unconstrained …rms with no delay. As such, there are no life-cycle aspects to …rms'investments in this economy, and, for the most part, …rms operate at a scale appropriate to their productivity. The quantitative impact of this more e¢ cient allocation of production is that steady state output rises by 10 percent relative to our full economy depicted in Figure 1 , with measured TFP rising by 2:5 percent.
Returning to our full economy with both frictions in place, Figure 3 illustrates the pure e¤ects of the irreversibility in cases where it does not interact with the …nancial friction in our economy.
Here, we summarize the capital choices made by unconstrained …rms entering the period with various levels of capital (measured on the x-axis) and debt (measured on the y-axis), conditional on a current productivity draw. The top panel depicts …rms entering with a low productivity value, the middle panel shows those with the median value, and the bottom panel shows those with a high productivity. The z-axis in each panel reports an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 for unconstrained …rms that invest positively to the upward target capital consistent with their current productivity, a value of 2 for those investing negatively to the relevant downward target, The region of (k; b) where …rms invest to their upward target expands into higher current capital levels as one looks from the top panel downward, since rises in current productivity predict higher marginal product of capital schedules next period. Looking leftward from these regions are the areas with zero investment induced by the irreversibility in capital. While the loss associated with uninstalling capital in our economy is only 5 percent, it nonetheless makes some …rms quite reluctant to shed capital. Those with higher current productivities are more so, given the persistence in " alongside depreciation. As such, the inactivity region expands to higher capital levels as productivity rises, while the region associated with downward investment shrinks, …nally disappearing by the bottom panel.
Note that Figure 3 is largely an expositional device. It depicts the directional capital choice adopted by unconstrained …rms at each potential …rm-level state rather than at states actually populated in the economy's stationary distribution. Restricting consideration to those states, the actual fraction of all …rms that are unconstrained and adjust to the upward target consistent with their productivity is 15 percent, the fraction remaining inactive is 20 percent, and the fraction undertaking negative investment is 5 percent. Firms that invest positively to the maximum capital permitted by their ability to borrow (below their upward target capital) are re ‡ected by a value of 3 on the z-axis. Among constrained …rms, these are the ones with higher current productivity, comparatively high capital, and comparatively low debt. There are more such …rms at higher values of ", as higher current production expands funds available for investment. To their right and back in each panel are …rms with low capital and high debt combinations that are forced to shed capital to repay their existing debt. These …rms (with an adjustment-type indicator 4) represent a larger fraction of constrained …rms at lower values of ", as it becomes harder to repay debt when current production is low. Here again, however, the …gure is expositional. In the actual stationary distribution, no such …rms exist.
Finally, Figure 5 illustrates the levels of output produced across the full range of capital and debt levels. As one would expect, the level of production at any given (k; b) combination rises with the level of productivity, and, examining any single current productivity, production rises with the …rm's capital stock. However, the level of debt has no in ‡uence here, since we do not require our …rms to pay their wage bills in advance of current production. Thus, the output …gures corresponding to this one are essentially unchanged in the corresponding economy without …nancial frictions. Of course, as we have seen above, this does not imply that steady state output, productivity and the distribution of production are unchanged, as each of these is in ‡uenced by the stationary distribution of …rms over the …rm-level state space.
Results
We begin to explore the dynamics by …rst considering the e¤ect each friction in our economy has on its typical business cycle. Table 1 presents some commonly reported business cycle statistics derived from an HP-…ltered 3000 period simulation of our full model economy under the assumption that aggregate productivity shocks are the only source of aggregate ‡uctuations, Table 2 presents the corresponding moments when we eliminate …nancial frictions, and Table 3 is the same economy with neither collateral constraints nor capital speci…city. As expected, each friction acts to reduce the average levels of output, capital, and consumption over our simulation.
Most notably, average output rises by roughly 10:5 percent when …nancial frictions are stripped away, then another 2 percent when the irreversibility is also eliminated.
Moving to consider second moments, there are some small di¤erences across the three tables.
Output volatility rises between our full economy and the counterpart model without limits to borrowing, and rises again between that model and the one with no frictions. Despite this, as each friction is lifted, the representative household grows more e¤ective in smoothing its consumption. As the contemporaneous correlation between consumption and production is slightly weakened from one table to the next, consumption's standard deviation (raw and relative) falls.
Elsewhere, the volatility of hours worked rises steadily, and is marginally more correlated with output as each friction is eliminated. The same monotone pattern does not follow for investment expenditures, however. There, the relative standard deviation falls from 3:9 percent to 3:7 percent as the …nancial friction is stripped away, allowing the inertia associated with irreversibility more prominence, while it rises to 4:1 percent when the irreversibility is eliminated.
While we have mentioned some minor di¤erences in the business cycle moments across tables 1 through 3, two points are surely more important. The …rst is that the business cycle moments drawn from our full model in Table 1 are similar to those of a typical real business cycle model without its complications (for instance, Hansen (1985) ). Output volatility is roughly 1:8 percent, consumption is about half as volatile as output, and investment roughly four times as volatile as output. We also see the customary strong positive contemporaneous correlations with output in consumption, investment, hours and wages. While the usual di¢ culties of excessive investment volatility and weak hours volatility are a bit more pronounced here relative to most representative …rm real business cycle models, these come from our di¤ering returns to scale in production rather than either friction we mean to study; the same features are present in Table 3 with both removed.
This brings us to our second point. Despite the di¤erences raised above, the second moments across all three tables are actually quite similar on the whole. Comparing Table 1 to Table 2 , in particular, it appears that the typical business cycle in our economy is relatively impervious to some ordinary, ongoing degree of …nancial frictions, although it implies roughly half of …rms in the economy are …nancially constrained. That noted, however, this is not at all the question we have set out to answer. Our main interest here is to understand what happens when the extent of …nancial frictions suddenly and unexpectedly grows far more severe than is normal. We explore this question via a series of impulse response …gures to which we turn now.
Figures 6 and 7 depict our economy's response to a …nancial crisis, absent any technology shock. More speci…cally, it is the response to a 22 percentage point drop in the value of …rms' collateral, as generated by a reduction in b , which implies a one-third reduction in new debt issuance. In designing this exercise, we assume that …rms predict a return to normal …nancial conditions will ultimately occur. Each period, they place 40 percent probability weight on a full …nancial recovery in the subsequent period. Thus, when the shock occurs in period 1, they expect that it will persist for 2:5 years.
Although the distribution of capital is predetermined when the …nancial shock hits in year 1, Figure 6 reveals that aggregate production immediately falls by about 0:3 percent (relative to its simulated mean in normal …nancial times) . This is, of course, a direct consequence of the 0:5 percent fall in the labor input, which is, in turn, a reaction to the reduced expected return to investment (shown in the middle panel of Figure 7 ). With the sudden reduction in credit, there is a sharp rise in the fraction of …rms that are …nancially constrained (from 60 percent to 67:4 percent).
Underlying this rise, young …rms are now far more curtailed in their investment activities relative to the pre-shock economy, and thus will take considerably longer to outgrow the …nancial frictions and begin producing at a scale consistent with their productivities. Moreover, some mature …rms that had been unconstrained in the pre-shock economy now …nd their collateral insu¢ cient to prevent …nancial frictions once again in ‡uencing their investment plans. These larger constrained …rms initially exhibit life-cycle investment similar to that in their youth, accumulating capital in e¤ort to outgrow the new …nancial friction irrespective of their productivities.
Notice that, unlike the response that would follow a negative productivity shock, consumption does not immediately fall when the …nancial shock hits our economy. Anticipating a sharp distortion to the distribution of production over coming years, and thus unusually low endogenous total factor productivity (see Figure 7) , the representative household in our economy expects a lowered return to saving. This leads to a 0:3 percent rise in consumption at the impact of the shock, and also a rise in leisure. This indirect endogenous TFP in ‡uence on hours worked is compounded by the fact that the initial aggregate capital stock is 6:5 percent above that consistent with the tighter borrowing conditions, which further encourages consumption. The fall in investment (in Figure 7) does not support consumption for long, however; it falls to its pre-shock average by year 3, then steadily declines for roughly 10 years before it levels o¤.
Elsewhere, labor falls at the impact of the shock as described above. Thereafter, given the severe misallocation of capital at the start of date 2, alongside reductions in the total capital stock, the marginal product of labor drops. This leads to larger reductions in employment. By year 4, it has fallen 2 percent below its pre-shock level, and it does not rise back to the level consistent with the new …nancial setting until around period 16. This long adjustment period is a re ‡ection of the time that it takes for the capital distribution to settle, as may be inferred from the endogenous TFP response in Figure 7 .
On balance, we take the following observation from Figure 6 . A tightening of collateral constraints alone, a purely …nancial shock, is capable of large and persistent real e¤ects in our model economy. In the example we have shown here, the misallocation of capital arising from tight …nancial conditions is compounded by the reductions in aggregate capital, productivity, and labor that it causes. As a result, there are protracted adjustments in aggregate quantities lasting a decade or more, and GDP is ultimately reduced by 2:7 percent, while aggregate consumption is reduced by 2 percent.
We next consider what implications the prolonged …nancial crisis from above can have if its onset is shortly followed by a 1 standard deviation negative technology shock. As seen in the top panel of Figure 8 , exogenous TFP falls one year after the …nancial shock hits, and thereafter gradually reverts to its mean. Were credit markets functioning as normal when this TFP shock appeared, output would fall 3:8 percent, labor would fall 1:8 percent, and the half-life of the output response would be roughly 5 years. In this case, however, with tight credit markets disrupting the economy in the background, the e¤ects of this otherwise ordinary negative productivity shock look more dramatic.
With employment and production already contracting due to the increased ine¢ ciency in capital allocation, labor drops 3:2 percent below its average at the impact of the productivity shock, while GDP drops to 5 percent below average. Thereafter, although exogenous TFP is smoothly rising back to trend, the …nancial crisis continues to hold real quantities down. Until borrowing conditions return to normal, total production will remain 2:7 percent below trend.
To this point, we have considered the implications of a persistent …nancial crisis, in that borrowing conditions do not recover throughout the exercises depicted in …gures 6 -8. As such, a natural question we have not yet addressed is this: "What should we expect to see in the recovery following a …nancial crisis?" We explore this question in Figure 9 . There, the same shock to the value of collateral hits the economy in date 1, and agents have the same expectations regarding …nancial recovery, as described above. The …nancial shock remains in place for 4 periods; thereafter, beginning in date 5, we allow a complete recovery of …nancial conditions, returning the value of collateral to normal. 10 Three aspects of the responses in Figure 9 are worthy of note. First, so long as GDP or consumption is adopted as our measure, the recovery from …nancial crisis is not brisk. Although credit markets are operating perfectly normally in year 5, GDP is roughly 2:2 percent below trend, and does not fully regain its pre-shock average level until year 11, while consumption takes substantially longer to return to trend. The slow recovery of output, given that real and …nancial frictions have been restored to their ordinary levels, arises from the long episode required for the distribution of capital to settle back to its pre-shock state. This, in turn, implies an episode over which aggregate productivity remains below normal, as seen in the bottom panel of the …gure.
Second, consumption does not begin to recover in date 5. Given a high demand for investment goods, and output's failure to recover rapidly, households actually allow their consumption to fall for an additional period and thereafter raise it only slowly. Third, during this episode, it is the labor input that drives the recovery. At date 6, when the allocation of capital across …rms has begun to move back toward its long-run distribution, the labor input rises sharply. It overshoots its average level and remains high for many periods while the capital stock is being rebuilt.
We may draw several conclusions about the implications of …nancial shocks from this third model-based exercise. First, absent any real shock to the economy, a temporary …nancial crisis on its own can generate a recession that is not only large, but persistent. Because tight borrowing conditions deliver a long-lived disruption to the distribution of capital, and thus to endogenous aggregate productivity, their aftermath is a long and anemic recovery in output and consumption of the sort one would never expect to see following a TFP shock. Moreover, when conditions in the …nancial sector do revert to normal, it is not household consumption expenditure, but instead business …xed investment, that leads the recovery, with this in turn derived from sharp increases in employment.
Concluding remarks
We have developed a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with collateralized borrowing constraints to explore how real and …nancial shocks interact in shaping aggregate ‡uc-tuations. In our model there is nontrivial heterogeneity in production; …rms face persistent idiosyncratic shocks to their total factor productivity and irreversibilities in investment dampen capital reallocation across …rms. The extent of these real frictions is chosen to be consistent with microeconomic evidence on establishment level investment dynamics.
Financial frictions impede capital reallocation from larger …rms that are relatively unproductive, but less a¤ected by borrowing constraints, to smaller …rms. In the steady state, the resultant change in the distribution of production reduces both aggregate output and total factor productivity, relative to an economy without collateralized borrowing constraints.
We …nd that the typical business cycle may be relatively una¤ected by …nancial frictions.
Nonetheless, a sharp reduction in lending brought about by an exogenous tightening of collateral requirements leads to a large, protracted recession. This recession is qualitatively di¤erent from that which would follow a technology shock. There is a hump-shaped response in employment, and the decline in consumption follows the reduction in production by several periods. When borrowing conditions return to normal, the recovery that follows is gradual, and led by employment and business …xed investment. Household consumption recovers slowly. 
